INTRODUCTION
Indicative conditionals display some surprising behavior when embedded. Perhaps most striking is the fact that some nestings of indicative conditionals appear to be uninterpretable, while others seem perfectly fine. Gibbard (1981) famously offers the following example of uninterpretable nesting:
(1) *If Kripke was there if Strawson was there, Anscombe was there. 1 1 Notice that interpretability is not helped if we move to the if if A then B, then C formulation,
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In contrast, the following example seems perfectly interpretable:
(2) If the cup broke if it was dropped, then it was fragile.
The difference between (1) and (2) poses an explanatory challenge for any view about the meanings of indicative conditionals.
One prominent view is that indicatives do not have truth values. When I say that if Sergio makes coffee then he'll spill some, I may express an epistemic attitude or make a conditional assertion, but I do not assert anything unconditionally that can properly be evaluated for truth or falsity. According to proponents of this view like Edgington (1995; 2000) and Bennett (2003) , (1) is uninterpretable because the nested conditional Kripke was there if Strawson was there does not provide truth conditions in a context where they are expected, and the result is nonsense. While the nested the cup broke if it was dropped likewise fails to provide truth conditions where expected, (2) can still be interpreted by ad hoc, pragmatic means. When we hear (2), we substitute for the embedded conditional a factual basis that would make the embedded conditional assertable, namely that the cup was disposed to break upon falling. So when we hear (2), we understand it as saying something to the effect of: (3) If the cup was disposed to break upon falling, it was fragile.
On this view, the default expectation is that a nested conditional will not be interpretable, but pragmatics can salvage it when an ad hoc interpretation is available.
We want to challenge the NTV way of handling the explanatory puzzle posed by nested conditionals. The crux of our challenge will be that the standard reasons to hold NTV about conditionals are likewise reasons to hold NTV about biconditionals, and yet biconditionals embed more freely than conditionals. In particular, if and only if embeds successfully in the very contexts where instead of the if A if B, then C formulation that Gibbard uses. We will follow Gibbard and others in focusing on the if A if B, then C formulation here and in subsequent examples; readers who are concerned that something may hang on this choice should check to their satisfaction that there is no significant difference in each instance.
embedding if/then makes for uninterpretability. Apparently, NTVers should be equally NTVist about if and only if, so they should expect if and only if to display a similar pattern of (un)interpretability. So why does if and only if embed where if/then does not?
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews some well-known arguments for NTV about conditionals and shows how they extend to biconditionals. Section 3 argues that if and only if embeds much more freely than if/then; most importantly, it embeds in the very same sentences where if/then does not embed.
Section 4 closes with a discussion of the import of these results.
ARGUMENTS FOR NTV
Why think that indicatives do not have truth conditions? Many reasons have been given but we will focus on two: Lewis's triviality result and Gibbardian standoffs. In each case, we claim, the argument readily extends to biconditionals. We will also briefly consider how two further arguments, due to Edgington and Bradley, can be similarly extended. In all four cases we will treat the original assumptions and steps uncritically, showing only how they extend to the case of biconditionals. Lewis (1976) showed that the probability of a conditional A → B is always trivialized, given two plausible assumptions. The first is that the probability of a conditional is always the same as the corresponding conditional probability.
Following Bennett, we label this assumption
The Equation p(A → B) = p(B|A) for any A and B.
The second assumption is that the correct way to update your probabilities in response to new evidence is Conditionalization:
Conditionalization If your probabilities are given by p and you receive new evidence A, your new degree of belief in any given B should be p(B|A).
Given The Equation and Conditionalization, it follows that
for any A and B, which is absurd. But this result can be blocked if we accept NTV. The proof turns on assigning probabilities to compounds of conditionals like (A → B) ∧ C. Given NTV, we may say that such compounds cannot be assigned probabilities since they are not truth-evaluable. The triviality result thus supports NTV, since NTV allows us to avoid absurdity while retaining The Equation and Conditionalization.
To extend the argument to biconditionals we need an extension of The Equation for biconditionals. Our assumption will be:
The Biquation can be motivated in several ways, both closely related to the motivation for The Equation. First, it follows from The Equation if we assume that
, 2 as seems plausible. Second, The Biquation has some plausibility in its own right. If B is certainly false given that A is true, then A ↔ B doesn't even have a shot, so it should have probability 0.
And if B is certainly true when A is true, then the only reason to doubt A ↔ B is (roughly) that A might be false when B is true. So the result should hang entirely on p(A|B).
Given The Biquation, we can derive the absurd result that p(A ↔ B) = p(A ∧ B). 3 As with Lewis's triviality result, the proof turns on being able to assign probabilities to compounds of biconditionals, so NTV about biconditionals
3 Proof: Let p B (·) be the probability function obtained from p in response to evidence B.
Conditionalization tells us that
The Biquation. Since Conditionalization also gives us p B (A ↔ B) = p(A ↔ B|B), we have
which is 0 since p ¬B (B|A) = p(B|A ∧ ¬B) = 0 and the second case of The Biquation applies.
can again be used to avoid absurdity. If (A ↔ B) ∧ C does not have truth conditions, we may decline to assign it a probability. So this triviality result supports NTV about biconditionals if Lewis's result supports NTV about conditionals.
Gibbardian standoffs (Gibbard, 1981) East Lever is down and thinks The water will run east if Top Gate opens. By conditional non-contradiction, they cannot both believe truly, and the symmetry of the situation forbids saying that one believes truly and the other falsely. Could they both believe falsely? Then they would have to be mistaken about some relevant fact, which it seems they are not: each draws her conclusion from true premises by good reasoning, overlooking nothing and possibly even suspecting the complete truth about the situation. Apparently what these agents believe is neither true nor false, as NTV predicts.
This argument extends to biconditionals without changing the example. The observer who sees East Lever down is just as entitled to The water will run east
Applying the theorem of total probability, we then have There are many other arguments for NTV about conditionals, and we suspect that many of them can be similarly extended to biconditionals. In general,
we conjecture, only minimal assumptions need to be added, and those assumptions either follow naturally from the original assumptions or else can be motivated in much the same way as the original assumptions. We will briefly outline two more examples to illustrate. Edgington's (1995, pp. 278-80) argument for NTV about conditionals extends quite naturally to biconditionals. Adapting Bennett's presentation of the argument to the case of biconditionals, we begin with the premises:
is sufficient for being certain that ¬A ↔ ¬B.
(P2) It is not necessarily irrational to disbelieve both A and B, yet also disbelieve A ↔ B.
If biconditionals have truth conditions, premise (P2) tells us that it is possible for
A ↔ B to be false while A and B are both false, i.e. while (A ∧ (4) is fully interpretable. We can well imagine circumstances in which the antecedent of (4) is false and yet we would accuse Gibbard of speaking falsely were he to tell us (4). If Anscombe's plans did not involve Kripke or Strawson in any way, nor did anything affecting her decision, then (4) It is tempting to dismiss (4) It is no fluke that (4) is better than (1). Here are a few more pairs to illustrate:
(7) *If Jimmy has a cat if he has a dog, then he has a parrot. In each of these pairs, the latter example is acceptable while the former is not.
DISCUSSION
We have argued that NTVers about conditionals should also be NTVers about biconditionals, and that biconditionals embed in conditionals where conditionals do not. Those who sought to explain problematic embeddings like (1) by appealing to NTV thus face a challenge. Why do biconditionals embed freely 8 inside of conditionals despite lacking truth conditions? We close with some discussion of possible reactions to this challenge.
NTVers do have a story to tell when if/then successfully embeds, and they may try to apply the same strategy to explain why (4) is acceptable. Recall, we supposedly find (2) acceptable because we substitute a factual basis for the embedded conditional the cup broke if it was dropped. Likewise, the NTVer may say, we find (4) acceptable because the locution if and only if suggests a factual basis that can be substituted into the antecedent. But why should we expect that if and only if would be more suggestive of a factual basis than if/then? We are again at a loss to explain the difference between (1) and (4).
The factual basis story might be better able to cut the difference between (1) and (4) if enhanced by an appeal to the syntactic differences between if/then and if and only if. There are some famous cases of perfectly interpretable sentences that appear to be uninterpretable, most famously "garden path" sentences like:
(11) The horse raced past the barn fell.
(11) sounds awfully bad, but is dramatically improved when understood as:
(12) The horse that was raced past the barn fell.
Perhaps there is something similar at work in cases like (1). The repetition of if, for example, may confuse the parsing of the sentence in a way that requires some pragmatic help for interpretation. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that it is somewhat difficult to interpret similar sentences, 5 such as: (13) One might complain that parsing considerations fail to explain the felicity of cases like the cup conditional, (2). This is a fair complaint, but it is important to note that not all sentences that are syntactically like (11) are equally hard to interpret, e.g.:
(18) The car cleaned in the barn died.
(19) ?The man cleaned in the barn died.
(18) is much easier to interpret than (19) or (11) because the car isn't an appropriate agentive subject for the putative verb phrase, cleaned in the barn, making a reading parallel to (12) the only available reading. It is not merely syntactic form that is responsible for (mis)leading the parser down a garden path -it is also the availability of the garden path reading. So we might productively combine parsing considerations with the NTVer's pragmatic story about ad hoc interpretation: unlike their conditional cousins, biconditional cases like (4) are sufficiently easy to parse that one can supply a story pragmatically to overcome their semantic defectiveness. But parsing causes enough trouble in the conditional cases that, in the presence of the additional pragmatic burden of finding a suitable factual basis, interpretability fails altogether. 6 As Jessica Rett has pointed out to us, phonetic prominence might play a role too. She notes that the following sounds much better than (1):
(17) ?If Kripke was there if, you know, Strawson was there, then Anscombe was there.
We are inclined to think that (17) is still hard to interpret, but we agree that adding material helps. This is consistent with a general parsing story.
A worry: if difficulties with parsing make the difference between (1) and (4) by adding to the pragmatic burden, shouldn't we be able to overcome the added obstacle in the right circumstances? For example, once we hear the more manageable (4) and supply an ad hoc interpretation, shouldn't we be able to return to (1) and provide a similar ad hoc interpretation? Relatedly, it is troubling that we don't seem able to say much about what the ad hoc interpretation of (4) is. We can imagine various things that might make Kripke's attendance and Strawson's attendance mutually dependent, and on which Anscombe's attendance could depend in turn. But none of these candidates for a factual basis seems to be specifically in mind when we interpret (4).
Perhaps the factual basis we supply for (4) is a disjunction of all the candidates for a factual basis. This does not seem to be what we do when we interpret easy cases like (2), where we supply a fairly specific basis like the cup was disposed to break upon being dropped. But the ad hoc interpretation story might be fleshed out to explain why, in cases like (2), a specific factual basis is readily available while in cases like (4) a specific factual basis is not. If NTVers want to pursue this avenue, they will have to develop their pragmatic story substantially to show that it can get the cuts in the right places.
We think that the embedding of conditionals is a very difficult topic and the data is extremely interesting and subtle. We take our observations about biconditionals to suggest two things in this connection. First, that non-pragmatic factors like parsing may play an important role in our judgments about examples like Gibbard's (1) . Second, that the pragmatic, ad hoc interpretation story itself needs substantial development in order to handle the full range of cases.
The moral, we suggest, is that we must expect the correct story about embeddings of conditionals to possess subtlety and complexity commensurate with that of the data.
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